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Abstract: Rapid middle income growth over the past decades has led to increasing public 
interest in the developing world’s ‘new middle classes’. However, these transformations have 
received less attention in the comparative democratization and welfare state regime literature. 
This review article aims to fill this gap, by identifying emerging evidence and new directions 
for research about the social and political consequences of lower middle income growth. We 
note that, while socio-cultural and political transformations traditionally associated with 
expanding middle classes are unlikely to materialize at current levels of socio-economic 
wellbeing in most developing countries, new pressures for reform may arise out of demands 
to better protect modest increases in private assets and from improved educational outcomes 
among lower middle income groups. We also identify signs of increased distributional 
conflicts between economically vulnerable lower middle income groups and more affluent 
middle classes that may undermine the transition to stable democracy and more inclusive 
social policy systems.  
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Introduction  
Rapid rates of poverty reduction and middle income growth have led to dramatic changes in 
the income distribution of developing countries. The global ‘extreme’ poverty headcount 
(measured by the international ‘extreme’ poverty line of US$ 1.25 and more recently US$ 
1.90 in Purchasing Power Parity [PPP] terms)1 has more than halved over the past 2 ½ 
decades. In the meantime, populations on lower middle and middle incomes have doubled in 
size and now account for well over two thirds of the inhabitants of developing regions.2 
While these trends were dominated by China and India, important progress has also been 
registered in poorer regions of the world like sub-Saharan Africa.3    
Little surprisingly, the developing world’s ‘new middle classes’ now play a prominent 
role in public and policy debates. Popular media outlets and the ‘grey’ literature of business 
consultancies, think tanks, and international aid agencies have variably described expanding 
middle income groups as heralds of economic growth,4 democratization,5 and social and 
cultural change.6 However, several observers also note limitations, such as the large number 
of households who still live on relatively low incomes,7 and the persistence of more 
conservative values among recently upwardly mobile populations.8  
The ‘new middle classes’ have received comparatively less attention in the political 
science literature on democratization and welfare state development. Recent studies of 
democratic transitions often take a longer-term view and do not yet take into account latest 
estimates of falling poverty rates and expanding lower-middle income populations in 
developing regions.9 Evidence about growth and policy preferences in lower and middle 
income groups also does not typically play a direct role in the academic literature on 
changing welfare state systems in developing regions.10 While more recent contributions have 
begun to rectify this shortcoming,11 these attempts are still few and far between and do not 
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yet provide a coherent framework to theorise about potential new conflict lines and actors 
that may emerge in the context of rapid lower middle income growth. 
This review article starts to fill this gap, by identifying emerging evidence and new 
directions for research about the social and political consequences of lower and middle 
income growth. While we do not seek to contribute to region-specific debates, we concentrate 
on the situation in the ‘average’ low or lower middle income country, where much of recent 
economic growth has taken place in incomes that are too low to be considered ‘middle class’ 
by advanced economies’ standards. We concur with literature on previous regime transitions 
that the weakness of occupational class structures and the persistence of wide-spread absolute 
poverty and vulnerability in many developing countries undermine the validity of more 
traditional theoretical frameworks that focus on class-based mobilization and changes in 
relative inequality as the primary drivers of democratization and political reform.12 At the 
same time, we note that even modest improvements in lower middle incomes may bring 
about transformations through alternative channels, such as new pressures for political reform 
and stronger protection of private property rights that result from the increased accumulation 
of assets and education among upwardly mobile lower income groups. After an overview of 
alternative approaches to defining the ‘new middle classes’, we develop these arguments by 
reviewing implications of recent lower middle income growth for descriptions of middle class 
development derived from modernization theory, redistributivist theories of democratization 
and welfare state reform, and by reviewing evidence about changing consumer behaviors and 
political preferences among lower middle income households.  
 
Defining the ‘new middle classes’ 
Researchers have traditionally struggled to agree on a common definition of class. The 
literature on the ‘new middle classes’ is no exception.  
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Recent ethnographic and sociological accounts of the ‘new middle classes’ have often 
eschewed a ‘hard’ definition. Drawing on the work of cultural sociologists like Bourdieu,13 
this literature typically defines middle classes around shared life styles and behaviors that 
resemble those of middle classes in advanced economies (for example consumer behaviors 
and choices of housing styles).14 However, while this literature produces increasingly rich 
evidence about new processes of social differentiation during times of rapid economic 
change, its primary drawback is the lack of anchoring in an interpersonally comparable 
standard of wellbeing that would be required for statements about the size and scope of the 
‘middle class phenomena’ analyzed. For example, according to evidence discussed below, 
many groups in emerging economies that begin to resemble the middle classes in developed 
countries are still relatively small and would be better described as economic elites, once the 
relative income distributions of their respective societies are taken into account. 
Other researchers have started from more ‘objective’ indicators, typically grounded in 
Marxist15 and Weberian concepts of class.16 In particular survey-based studies of middle class 
behaviors and attitudes have often relied on proxy-indicators of socio-economic status, like 
respondents’ education, economic assets, or employment and occupational status.17 However, 
the primary problem with these approaches again arises from the particular social and 
economic context within which recent poverty reduction occurred in the developing world. 
Although lower middle income growth over the past decades was often accompanied by a 
structural shift into self-employment or service-related jobs, many developing countries did 
not see the emergence of large entrepreneurial or manufacturing classes that are usually at the 
heart of sociological debates about class relations.18 Other often-used indicators of middle 
class status, like formal employment, higher education, or ownership of costlier middle class 
assets like cars also often fail to capture much variation at the lower tail of the income 
distribution, where much of the recent growth in developing countries was concentrated.19  
5 
 
Economists, whose work dominates the literature reviewed here, have typically 
circumvented the complexity of the class concept and relied on people’s income as the sole 
indicator. This research can be further divided into relative and absolute approaches. Relative 
approaches have been influential in earlier work about the middle classes and include 
indicators like the income share held by the middle quantiles of the population, relative 
income ranks20 or self-reported income status.21 These measures have a foundation in 
sociological and social-psychological perspectives on social inequality, and are meant to 
capture experiences like relative deprivation, polarization, and status inequality that are often 
identified as drivers of distributional and political conflict.22 For instance, an early example 
of the literature reviewed here by William Easterly23 focuses on the income accruing to 
households between the 20th and 80th percentile of the population, arguing that this measure 
describes the extent of polarization and cohesion in society, which in turn is used to predict 
the likelihood of political conflict, democratic performance, and stable economic growth.24 
The primary problem with these relative measures for the purpose of our discussion 
arises again from the comparatively modest living standards among populations in the middle 
of national income distributions of many developing countries. Banerjee and Duflo25 show 
for a sample of low and middle income economies that households in the 20th to 80th 
percentile range that is used to define middle classes in Easterly’s study still live on average 
incomes that are close to the extreme PPP$ 2 poverty line. This is consistent with previous 
work by Milanovic and Yitzhaki26 and subsequently Ravallion,27 who find that only small 
shares of the population in the developing world qualify as ‘middle class’, if absolute living 
standards of developed countries are taken as a reference.  
In this article we follow an emerging consensus to define middle classes around (PPP-
adjusted) absolute income thresholds. This approach typically uses a lower bound set variably 
between the international PPP$ 2 extreme (food) poverty line and the PPP$ 4 poverty 
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threshold of more affluent developing regions (e.g. Latin America)28 and further includes a 
cut-off around PPP$ 10 per capita per day, to distinguish households who are still vulnerable 
to poverty from economically more ‘secure’ groups. The underlying motivation behind this 
definition is the Weberian notion that households should enjoy a certain minimum of 
economic security to be considered middle class.29 Additional income thresholds have been 
set variably at PPP$ 20, 50 or 100, to identify higher income groups whose living standards 
begin to approach those of middle classes in developed countries.30 
Although these definitions lack an explicit grounding in relativist conceptions of 
class, there are some signs that they capture relevant social experiences. For example, 
perception surveys from Latin America suggest that absolute definitions of economic 
vulnerability and middle class status often predict subjective status differences better than 
relative approaches that use national median incomes as a reference.31 Yuan et al. document 
for urban China that, while respondents on incomes between PPP$2–10 often report higher 
levels of life satisfaction than the extreme poor, they still tend to express much stronger 
feelings of economic insecurity and concerns about the future than other groups.32   
According to recent estimates that use the above thresholds, large population shares in 
low, lower middle, and even some upper middle income countries still live, and will continue 
to live for some time, in the ‘vulnerable’ income range below PPP$ 10 (Figures 1 and 2, we 
use PPP$ 2.50 as the lower bound).33 Sizeable population shares on more ‘secure’ and 
affluent incomes typically only emerge in some upper middle, and non-OECD high income 
countries, as well as in economically more advanced regions like Eastern Europe and Latin 
America.34 However, especially in populous middle income countries, like China and India, 
the absolute numbers of households on incomes above PPP$ 10 begin to approach or even 
exceed those in developed regions by some estimates.35 
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Figures 1 and 2 about here 
 
 
Pathways from lower middle income growth to wider social and political development 
outcomes 
The relatively small size of ‘Western-type’ middle classes and the weakness of clear 
occupational class divides in many developing countries pose obvious problems for analysis 
that seeks to understand political transformations through the terminology of social class. 
This problem was already noted in studies of previous regime transitions in developing 
countries,36 which consequently focused on alternative actors and sources of political 
mobilization, such as social movements,37 ‘popular’ or ‘middle sectors’,38 moderate elements 
in incumbent authoritarian regimes,39 or local cultural elites and intellectuals.40 We follow in 
this tradition in arguing that the socio-economic context of many developing countries 
requires a move away from conventional concepts of middle class development and 
associated assumptions about the link between inequality and regime outcomes. In the next 
sections we develop this argument around three topics, (i) deviations between observed 
political behaviors and attitudes among lower middle income groups in developing countries 
and modernization theoretical accounts of middle class development, (ii) the impact of lower 
middle income growth on distributional conflict and welfare reform, (iii) and possible 
changes in political behaviors due to the increased accumulation of physical and human 
capital assets by lower middle income households. Throughout, we also stress the importance 
of socio-economic and political regime contexts, which we believe are crucial for predicting 
when and how lower middle income groups are able to organize around their shared political 
interests.  
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Analytical challenges 
Before we continue with our discussion it is important to be clear about limitations in the data 
and evidence that support the literature reviewed here. With few exceptions, information on 
the size and political behaviors of lower and middle income groups in developing countries is 
based on cross-sectional studies and on one-off survey ‘snapshots’.41 This limits researchers’ 
ability to track people’s behaviors and preferences as they move in and out of poverty, which 
would be required to support claims that poverty reduction causes new forms of political 
engagement or conflict. In the following we highlight studies that overcome these 
shortcomings whenever possible. However, we also conclude by calling for investments in 
more and better longitudinal data and case studies, to improve the understanding of the 
consequences of lower middle income growth and allow for better policy responses in the 
future. 
At the same time, we note considerable new opportunities for research that arise from 
the improved availability of detailed data on poverty and lower middle income growth trends. 
Whereas previous studies of the link between poverty reduction and political and social 
regime change often had to rely on relatively broad indicators, such as GDP per capita, the 
Gini index, or average caloric consumption and child mortality,42 recent improvements in 
survey and micro-economic data permit much more detailed estimates of the size and 
economic circumstances of specific segments of the income distribution. We argue that these 
improvements represent significant progress over earlier data sources because they are better 
suited for capturing emerging new distributional divides and group-specific experiences of 
wellbeing and economic security. A primary objective of this review is to promote the use of 
this new information, while also advocating for continued investments in improved data 
quality. 
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Modernization theory and observed political preferences of lower middle income households 
A natural starting point for our discussion includes modernization accounts of middle class 
development.43 Moore’s famous dictum ‘No bourgeoisie, no democracy’44 has provided a 
highly influential point of reference for previous debates about middle class-led political 
transitions. It has also shaped recent commentary on the ‘new middle classes’, which has 
often postulated a preference of the developing world’s growing middle income groups for 
market-friendly economic reforms, good governance and progressive cultural policies.45  
Despite these claims, the distance between modernization theory and the reality in 
many developing countries today clearly remains quite large. In particular the circumstances 
of populous ‘vulnerable’ groups on incomes between PPP$2-10 are still far removed from 
those of bourgeois middle classes in the historical development of today’s advanced 
economies, who usually enjoyed considerable control over means of production, commerce 
and finance. Gaps between theory and local reality also emerge from recent analysis of 
political outcomes and attitudes in countries undergoing rapid lower middle income growth. 
Cross-country analysis by Loayza et al.46 - to our knowledge the only study that makes direct 
use of newly available data on poverty trends and lower middle income growth to test for 
signs of an emerging ‘progressive middle class consensus’ - only find significant 
improvements in outcomes like health and education spending, trade and economic policy, 
and governance quality, when growth was concentrated on incomes above PPP$ 10. By 
contrast, expansion of populations with incomes between PPP$ 2.5 and 10 was not associated 
with positive effects when compared to countries where growth was concentrated among 
poor populations with incomes below PPP$ 2.5.47 Signs of meaningful transformations in 
political attitudes at lower income levels similarly do not emerge in earlier cross country 
analysis of value and perception surveys. While this literature does not reject the possibility 
that poor and economically vulnerable groups can be fervent defenders of democracy,48 
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systematic shifts towards more ‘progressive’ value systems are typically only observed at 
average income levels above those of countries that saw particularly fast rates of recent lower 
middle income growth over the past decades.49  
Within-country analysis of political attitudes by income group illustrates how 
economic insecurity may undermine the emergence of politically progressive preferences 
among lower middle income groups. Lopez-Calva et al.50 find for several Latin American 
countries that respondents with estimated incomes between PPP$ 4-10 were more likely than 
both the poor and affluent groups to express a preference for populist and authoritarian forms 
of government that often dominate politics in the region.51 Another worrying result of this 
study is that, although respondents in the vulnerable income range report more positive 
perceptions of economic opportunity than the poor, they did not express more trust in the 
political institutions of their countries (higher levels of trust only emerged among more 
affluent households). A recent study of middle class attitudes in Kenya also documents that 
support for democratic institutions was generally lower among households who still 
frequently faced challenges to satisfy their basic needs.52 Resnick53 finds for Zambia that 
lower levels of trust even persisted among households on comparatively ‘secure’ incomes of 
up to PPP$ 20.  
Despite this emerging evidence a legitimate question remains whether the income-
based definitions that dominate in the literature are sufficiently grounded in social contexts 
and interactions to capture the emergence of ‘class-like’ identities and preferences. Amoranto 
et al. and the aforementioned study by Lopez-Calva et al. find that, while responses to 
questions on composite indices relating to trust, perceptions of opportunity, legitimization of 
political violence, left-right partisanship, and economic policy generally change 
monotonically with self-reported status and income, there are typically no distinct jumps in 
the data that would point to the emergence of discrete class-specific identities. Both 
11 
 
contributions also find that self-reported political attitudes generally differ more between 
countries than across income groups within the same society.54 Studies of perception surveys 
that focus on alternative dimensions of social identification, such as education, job 
characteristics, ethnicity, religion, and urban-rural status, also often find larger differences in 
political attitudes between these categories than along income ranks.55 This is consistent with 
parallel research, which has often struggled to find robust links between personal incomes 
and political preferences in countries with lower levels of economic development and high 
inequality– in other words the universe of countries that account for most of the world’s 
recent lower middle income growth.56   
In our reading a fruitful direction for future research is a more thorough integration of 
income-based measures with other locally ‘salient’ markers of social identity. For instance, 
case studies of recent conflicts in Thailand suggest that violent clashes between the 
conservative ‘upper middle class’ ‘Yellow Shirts’ and the pro-Taksin government ‘Red 
Shirts’ movements were reinforced by the successful blending of urban lower middle class 
and ‘rural poor’ identities in the case of the ‘Red Shirts’ movement.57 Comparable claims 
have been made in media and blog commentary on violent clashes in Turkey and Egypt, 
which are often presented as conflicts between upwardly mobile but culturally more 
conservative rural middle income groups and more progressive urban middle classes.58 The 
rich literature on public action and ethnic patronage in Africa similarly suggests that, 
although class-based interests at times crowd out ethnic affiliations, ethnic identity remains a 
factor in the background that can easily shape political organization along class lines.59 Like 
our recommendation, this literature increasingly starts to marry economic and ethnic 
categories in the analysis of ethnic conflict and public goods provision.60 
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Lower middle income growth and distributional conflict   
Despite their obvious limitations, income-based measures provide a potentially more useful 
link to literature on distributional conflicts and political outcomes in developing countries. 
Easterly, in his aforementioned study of middle class development has suggested that a 
higher share of income accruing to populations in the middle of the income distribution can 
contribute to improved economic and political outcomes, by reducing levels of inequality and 
polarization.61 Easterly‘s argument does not presume the emergence of discrete class 
identities or progressive middle class behaviors, but focuses instead on increased social 
cohesion and reduced polarization as middle incomes grow. Class-specific identities and 
behaviors are also not needed in recently influential political economy models that relate 
democratic transitions to declining levels of inequality and demands for redistribution.62 
Drawing on the individualistic calculus of the Median Voter Model,63 these theories predict 
that falling poverty numbers and middle income growth would result in a shift in the 
distribution of individual political preferences to the right, away from calls for radical 
redistribution. This in turn would increase the likelihood of democratization, by reducing 
elites’ fear that political power sharing will be followed by an expropriation of their assets in 
favor of the poor.  
The primary problem with these models for the social and economic transformations 
discussed here again arises from the relatively low living standards of many middle income 
groups in developing countries. Earlier research on the link between poverty reduction and 
regime change in developing regions suggest that demands for redistribution in countries that 
experience rapid growth in the presence of persistent extreme deprivations will often 
increase, if populations demand more social spending, to eradicate remaining pockets of 
poverty.64 Calls for redistribution may also increase if upwardly mobile, but economically 
vulnerable, groups demand higher social spending, to protect them from the uncertainties of 
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rapid economic and social change. Signs of this effect are documented by Wietzke,65 who 
finds that support for government redistribution grew more rapidly in societies that 
experienced faster rates of growth among groups on incomes closer to the PPP$ 2 poverty 
line. The same study documents much lower levels of redistribution support in countries that 
experienced growth in the ‘secure’ income range above PPP$ 10, hinting at potentially deep 
differences in social policy preferences between vulnerable groups and more affluent middle 
classes (see below). Previous research by Cramer and Kaufman,66 who rank respondents on 
the basis of household assets, finds that, even though redistribution preferences of poorer and 
middle-income groups are not well-explained by relative wellbeing or inequality, these 
groups’ satisfaction with distributional outcomes was significantly reduced in times of rapid 
economic growth. While the authors speculate that feelings of relative deprivation explain 
this result, experiences of social risk and volatility during periods of rapid economic 
transformation may also clearly play a role.  
Going forward, we believe considerable progress can be made by assessing the 
potential for distributional conflict within wider regime and social policy contexts, similar to 
analytical approaches adopted by earlier comparative welfare state and regime transition 
literature.67 Recent analysis suggests that major emerging powers with large lower middle 
income groups like China, India, and Indonesia have already surpassed the income levels of 
today’s advanced economies when the latter introduced social assistance and health programs 
for their lower income populations. However, today’s emerging economies spend much less 
on average on social protection programs then today’s developed countries at the time.68 
Tensions involving lower and middle income groups are also likely to be exacerbated by the 
‘truncated’ and fragmented fiscal and social policy systems of many developing countries. 
Multiple case studies indicate that social policy systems in regions like Latin America or Asia 
are divided between social insurance systems that disproportionally benefit more affluent 
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formal sector workers and social assistance and cash transfers whose targeting criteria 
exclude households above national poverty lines.69  
The extent of future distributional conflict is likely to depend crucially on how 
existing political regime and social policy contexts shape the ability of upwardly mobile 
groups to organize and build political coalitions. For instance, recent comparative analysis of 
welfare state reform processes suggests that vulnerable groups were often more vocal and 
better able to form political alliances in support of social protection and poverty alleviation 
programs in regions like Eastern Europe and Latin America, where the combination of prior 
democratic reforms and the legacy of historically more developed welfare states and 
manufacturing sectors have created favorable political conditions for more expansive and 
inclusive social policies.70 Lower middle income growth is also likely to have important 
implications for other closely related fields of research, such as on the use of social programs 
for government patronage and clientelism. In particular, it is probable that continued middle 
income growth will affect the incidence and manifestation of government patronage, if 
improving living standards raise the economic and political costs of pay outs and pork-barrel 
politics.71 
Another, closely related area for future research concerns possible coalitions between 
upwardly mobile lower income groups and more established affluent middle classes. 
Coalitions involving affluent middle classes are often seen as an important precondition for 
successful political mobilization processes. This claim has been made, for example, for the 
recent political uprisings in the Middle East,72 as well as for recent protests over social 
inequality and corruption in Latin America, which have been variably described as joint 
movements by vulnerable and affluent middle classes.73  
However, the literature is generally divided whether middle classes will always 
support demands of lower income groups.74 For instance, Birdsall75 notes that in most low 
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and lower middle income countries, where people on higher middle incomes still account for 
small shares of the population, affluent middle classes are often more easily co-opted by 
political authorities, such as through employment in the public sector or in state-owned 
companies. The failure to arrive at more coherent social policy reforms and increased tax-
based social spending in many developing countries similarly has been attributed to the 
difficulty of achieving political buy-in from more affluent middle classes, who often opt for 
higher quality private services and do not directly benefit from newly established means-
tested social assistance programs targeted at poorer income groups.76 
Assessments of the likelihood of coalitions with affluent middle classes can be 
enriched by taking into account lessons from the literature on relative inequality and social 
mobility.77 For instance, Hirschman’s78 well-known ‘Tunnel effect’ hypothesis suggests that 
rapid economic growth can reduce distributional class conflicts, by creating shared prospects 
for upward mobility. But these mitigating effects can wear off if some groups begin to 
experience real or perceived threats of falling behind. This is particularly probable for ‘more 
established’ affluent middle classes, for whom the possibility of relative status decline is 
more realistic in times of wide-spread upward economic mobility. 
Evidence from value and perception surveys again provides support for such divides. 
Research by Graham and Pettinato79 for Latin America finds that, even at the comparatively 
modest average incomes in the region in the 1990s, attitudes of affluent middle classes were 
often driven by fears of status decline and relative deprivation. While absolute income levels 
matter more for the subjective wellbeing of lower-income groups, relative differences became 
much more important for those in more comfortable economic circumstances. The authors 
also identify a large group of ‘frustrated achievers’ in Peru, who, despite experiencing 
significant improvements in their incomes, remained unsatisfied with their relative status in 
society. They speculate that this has to do with comparisons with groups higher in the income 
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ladder, similar to sentiments often documented among ‘squeezed middle classes’ in advanced 
economies.80 In a similar vein, Ravallion and Lokshin81 report for Russia that non-poor 
households who feared a fall in their incomes supported stronger redistribution. Both of these 
studies use panel data and are therefore able to account for individual mobility trajectories. 
These results are consistent with the often-documented finding for developed economies that 
money increasingly loses ground to relative welfare comparisons and other more qualitative 
aspects of people’s circumstances in the subjective wellbeing evaluations of more affluent 
groups.82 
 
Changing consumer behaviors 
A third channel that we believe deserves more attention involves the effect of income growth 
and increased asset accumulation on the political behaviors of lower middle classes.  
Microeconomic theory suggest that even modest improvements in lower middle incomes 
observed in large parts of the developing world can have significant impacts on household 
discretionary spending and consumption.83 Support for this is available for a range of 
geographic regions. Birdsall et al.84 show for Latin America that, whereas poor households 
allocate an estimated 70–90% of their expenditure to food and other basic necessities, those 
in the PPP$ 4-10 range spend only 24–36% of their income on basic needs, the rest going to 
‘middle class’ consumer goods like electronic appliances. Tschirley et al.85 find gradually 
increasing shares of consumption of processed food among African households on incomes 
between PPP$ 2-20. Banerjee and Duflo and Thurlow et al.86 identify larger dwelling 
structures and better access to water, sanitation and electricity in the vulnerable income 
range, especially on incomes closer to the PPP$ 10 threshold. Increased use of electricity also 
goes along with a higher likelihood of television ownership and other media use, attributes 
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which have been linked to recent changes in behaviors and political aspirations among lower 
middle class citizens.87 
Middle income growth, in interaction with wider demographic transformations, also 
often leads to changes in household investments in education and other non-material assets in 
ways that resemble the ‘delayed gratification’ behaviors typically attributed to more affluent 
middle classes. Micro-level studies have found that, relative to poorer households, adult 
women in the vulnerable and ‘secure’ income range tend to have fewer children.88 The 
combination of rising absolute incomes and fewer children often implies a net improvement 
in per capita education spending, even when the relative share of household expenditures 
devoted to education remains stable. Households’ access to health services and insurance, 
also typically increases in the vulnerable and ‘secure’ income ranges. Many of these services, 
however, are contracted from private providers, suggesting that also lower income 
households are willing to opt out of public services when the latter are perceived to be of 
insufficient quality.89 
While previous literature has often focused on the effects of increased household 
consumption on economic growth and private sector development,90 it is entirely conceivable 
that the emerging accumulation of physical and human assets will also influence social and 
political outcomes through other channels. It can be expected, for example, that growing 
educational investments among lower middle income individuals should turn into a major 
driver of reform, once today’s lower middle income children become workers and voters. 
Moreover, even in the short term, wide-spread increases in household spending on basic 
utilities and social services should have cumulative effects on aggregate social development 
outcomes. Support for this argument is provided by Cobham and Sumner,91 who show that 
rising incomes of the poorest income groups –defined in relative terms- are associated with 
improvements in non-monetary indicators like clean water supply and lower child mortality.92  
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In our view, another important potential consequence of increased asset accumulation 
is a change in public attitudes about the importance of personal economic and property rights. 
An insightful model by Ansell and Samuels93 suggests that accumulation of income and 
wealth by upwardly mobile, yet politically disenfranchised, groups can result in demands for 
political reforms, if these groups fear expropriation of their assets by ruling elites. The model 
is presented explicitly as an alternative to redistributivist theories of regime change 
mentioned above, with stronger roots in contractarian thought and reduced emphasis on 
people’s concerns about income inequality. As a consequence, its premises can hold, even 
when lower middle income growth does not translate into the predicted reduction in 
distributional conflicts.  
Although the model was not written for today’s developing countries, we see some 
support for its premises in the recent rise in anti-corruption protests in emerging economies. 
Many case studies have pinpointed grievances about government corruption –real or 
perceived- as major causes of political mobilization among lower income groups in regions 
as diverse as Latin America, Asia, or Africa.94 Concerns about government and public sector 
accountability have also been identified as drivers of recent upheavals in the Arab world. For 
example, Birdsall95 suggests that Mohamed Bouazizi, the street vendor whose self-
immolation triggered the uprising in Tunisia, was a member of the upwardly mobile but 
vulnerable ‘lower middle class’. According to eye-witness accounts Bouazizi’s protest was 
directly motivated by anger about what he perceived to be routine harassment and obstruction 
of his modest business interests by local authorities. Concerns about limited economic 
opportunity and little accountable political elites also dominate in other accounts of lower and 
middle class behavior during the uprisings in the Arab world.96 
It is important to note however, that none of these developments necessarily offset 
more fundamental obstacles to democratic and social policy reforms discussed elsewhere in 
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this article. The previously cited evidence from perception surveys and the long history of 
authoritarian ‘strong men’ in lower middle income countries amply illustrate that 
economically vulnerable populations are often willing to forgo more fundamental political 
liberties to support regimes that promise to root out petty corruption through a more 
authoritarian style of government.97 Anti-corruption demonstrations of lower income groups 
in other contexts also often stopped short of demands for more fundamental democratic 
change. For example in China, many recent anti-corruption protests were primarily directed 
against local government officials, but they have not been linked to questions about the 
legitimacy of communist one-party rule.98  
For future research this points to possible analytical frameworks that compare 
consequences of lower middle income growth across multiple dependent variables, ranging 
from measures of democratic transition and regime breakdown to ‘lower level’ outcomes, 
such as government control of corruption or procedural measures of democracy and law 
enforcement.99 In most cases, we would expect much more immediate effects of lower 
middle income growth on measures of government quality and corruption than on more 
fundamental indicators of regime type and transition.  
 
 
Conclusion 
There can be little doubt that recent changes in the income distribution of low and middle 
income countries will continue to shape social and political realities in the developing world 
for years to come. We have argued for a stronger integration of emerging evidence about 
these transformations into the comparative analysis of democratization and social policy 
reform processes. Based on our review, we expect that improved cross-fertilization across 
currently distinct literatures on middle income growth and political transitions would result in 
much more nuanced understanding of social and political transformations currently under 
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way in developing countries. We also concur with others before us that important progress 
can be made by combining economic analysis of changing poverty trends and distributional 
outcomes with comparative perspectives on pre-existing social conflict lines and relevant 
regime and institutional contexts.   
Despite these potentials, we stress again the need for continued investments in data 
quality about the ‘new middle classes’. As noted earlier in this paper, an important 
shortcoming of much of the available literature is the limitation to relatively aggregated 
cross-sectional information, which constraints researchers’ ability to make causal inferences 
about the social and political consequences of lower middle income growth. Although a 
response to this problem may require non-trivial upfront investments (such as by augmenting 
household expenditure panel surveys with modules on political attitudes and behaviors or by 
conducting new longitudinal case studies and surveys), such efforts would be highly 
worthwhile. A more robust understanding of the behaviors and motivations of upwardly 
mobile populations has potentially vast benefits for the design of economic and social 
policies in today’s emerging economies. It should not be undermined by data limitations and 
analytical blind spots that have relatively simple technical fixes. 
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